

L'impatto dei *social media* sulla cittadinanza politica



GIOVANNI DAMELE
Universidade Nova de Lisboa



PONTIFICIO ATENEO SANT'ANSELMO

Piazza Cavalieri di Malta 5, 00153 Roma | www.anselmianum.com

giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

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«The 2008 Obama campaign set new standards for creative use of these technologies that were central to their candidate's success. [...] The Internet and grassroots efforts, combined with polling, gave the Obama campaign impressive amounts of “real time” data that allowed them to be tactically quite agile throughout the primary and general election campaign».

[Polsby et al. 2012: 85]

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«A fully personalized speech market, consisting of countless niches, would make self-government less workable. In important ways it would reduce, not increase, freedom for the individuals involved. It would create a high degree of social fragmentation. It would spread falsehoods, some of them dangerous. It would make mutual understanding far more difficult among individuals and groups. To the extent that people are using the Internet in this way, they are disserving both themselves and their fellow citizens».

[Sunstein, 2017: 253]

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- *Filter bubbles* [Pariser 2011]
- *Cascades* [Del Vicario et al. 2016]
- *Echo-chambers* [Bessi et al. 2015a]

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The digital swarm does not constitute a mass because no soul— no spirit— dwells within it. The soul gathers and unites. In contrast, the digital swarm comprises isolated individuals. The mass is structured along different lines: its features cannot be traced back to individuals. [...] The digital swarm lacks the soul or spirit of the masses. Individuals who come together as a swarm do not develop a we . No harmony prevails—which is what welds the crowd together into an active entity. Unlike the crowd, the swarm demonstrates no internal coherence. It does not speak with a voice. [Han 2015: 10]

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The classic crowd [...] — as in the case of workers assembled in a mass — is not volatile but voluntative. Organized labor is not a matter of fleeting patterns; it consists of enduring formations . With a single spirit, unified by an ideology, it marches in one direction . On the basis of will and resolve, it has capacity for collective action and takes standing relations of domination head on. Only when a crowd is resolute about shared action does power arise. The mass is power . In contrast, digital swarms lack such resolve. They do not march . Because of their fleeting nature, no political energy wells up. [Han 2015: 12]

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«[Trump] favored courting controversy through provocative pronouncements, attributed comments, distorted facts, and an off-the-cuff ("politically incorrect") speaking style».

[Wells *et al.*, 2016: 670]

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- Bolle ideologico-informative autoreferenziali (\neq contesto critico)
- Carattere prevalentemente antagonista e conflittuale delle interazioni digitali tra dissenzienti
- Viralità della propagazione di informazioni fuorvianti, false e provocatorie

[Gometz 2017]

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- *The Post-Truth Era [Keyes 2004]*

Post-truthfulness exists in an ethical twilight zone. It allows us to dissemble without considering ourselves dishonest

- *The Death of Expertise [Nichols 2017]*

This is more than a natural skepticism toward experts. I fear we are witnessing the death of the ideal of expertise itself, a Google- fueled, Wikipedia-based, blog-sodden collapse of any division between professionals and laypeople, students and teachers, knowers and wonderers— in other words, between those of any achievement in an area and those with none at all.

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Disintermediation

«This type of campaign could only be successful because established institutions – especially the mainstream media and political-party organizations – had already lost most of their power» [Persily 2017: 64]

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Disintermediation

«Traditional media, which had long played a “gatekeeper” role in setting the agenda for campaign discourse, had been losing ground for some time even before the rise of the Internet»

[Persily 2017: 65]

«A new style of behaviour [...] characterised by dissemination, autonomy and horizontality, with a mobilisation that is more oriented towards specific problems, more through isolated actions than stable bureaucratic organisations, such as the political parties or unions»

[Inglehart 1990]

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- Conoscenza della realtà o in modo disintermediato, basandosi sulla propria esperienza personale, o in modo mediato da soggetti, gruppi, comunità di *non esperti*, selezionati (a seconda dei casi algoritmicamente, inconsciamente o deliberatamente) per i più svariati motivi, ma soprattutto perché confermano la visione del mondo a cui più piace credere o perché dicono quello che più si è emotivamente predisposti a udire [Gometz 2017]
- euristica dell'affetto e *bias* dei processi di formazione delle credenze [Kahneman 2012]

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«The quality of “being informed” occurs within an environment of membership»

«In this fashion, the politician seeks, by acting theatrically, to establish an audience, a public»

«The competition in information, brings about increasing dramatization. Each new item of news is presented in such a way as to cause a stronger impression than whatever came before it. And so the message tends to be increasingly»

[Pizzorno 1985: 58]

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Tailor-made for the Internet age

«Trump campaign's effective and overwhelming use of Twitter»

«One noticeable difference between the campaigns was Trump's embrace of Facebook Live»

[Persily 2017: 64-65]

New ways to use old media

[Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018, Chapt. 4]

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Twitter

«Trump's tweets were retweeted more than three times as often than Hillary Clinton's»

«20 percent of Trump's own tweets were retweets of the general public»

«Thanks in part to his followers' habit of retweeting him, his tweets dominated discussion of the election in every forum

[Persily 2017: 64]

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Facebook

«[Trump's] Facebook posts were reshared five times more often [than Hillary Clinton's]»

«Although the Trump campaign's digital video presence was generally rough and relied on live events, it lent the campaign an air of authenticity that was lacking in the well-polished, television-quality web videos of the Clinton campaign»

[Persily 2017: 64-65]

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New ways to use old media

«Trump set the news agenda»

«During August 2016 the CNN, CBS, MSNBC, and NBC Twitter accounts mentioned Trump almost three times as often as they did Clinton»

[Persily 2017: 64; 67]

«[Twitter's] role is more as a feeding ground for other media»

[Feldman, 2016]

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«If your position is going to move as a result of group discussion, it is likely to move in the direction of the most persuasive position defended within the group, taken as a whole. [...] If the group's members are already inclined in a certain direction, they will offer a disproportionately large number of arguments tending in that same direction, and a disproportionately small number of arguments tending the other way. The consequence of discussion will naturally be to move people further in the direction of their initial inclinations. [...] The group's members, to the degree that they shift, will shift toward a more extreme position in favor of the current leader. And the group as a whole, if a group decision is required, will move not to the median position but instead to a more extreme point. On this account, the central factor behind group polarization is the existence of a limited argument pool».

[Sunstein, 2017]

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«The resulting loss of credibility translates into a loss of trust in whoever is sending the message. This dramatization of information, therefore, helps generate public skepticism. From here disaffection for politics spreads, and party identification becomes more fluid, more fickle»

[Pizzorno 1985: 58-59]

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